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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Christopher A. Pentico appeals from the district court's appellate decision
affirming the magistrate's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The facts underlying Pentico's conviction for trespass are as follows:
On March 25, 2008, an officer stopped Pentico on state property, in
the vicinity of the Capitol annex, and informed Pentico that he was
no longer authorized to be at the Capitol Annex, the third and fourth
floors of the Borah Building, and the department of education. On
April 2, 2008, Pentico visited the Governor's office on the third floor
of the Borah Building. After Pentico left the Borah Building, he was
cited for trespass ....
State v. Pentico, 151 Idaho 906, 909, 265 P.3d 519, 522 (Ct. App. 2011). The
Court of Appeals rejected several constitutional challenges, holding that some
were not preserved and not fundamental error.
27.

!st at

912-14, 265 P.3d at 525-

The Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed Pentico's conviction, concluding

that Pentico's actions when he entered the reception area of the Governor's
office on April 6 were not constitutionally protected.

!st at 916, 265 P.3d at 529.

Pentico filed a petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp. 5-17.) One of the
claims was that trial counsel was ineffective for not claiming that the March 25
exclusion from certain government property violated Pentico's rights. (R., pp. 1016.) The state moved for summary dismissal of the petition.

(R., pp. 22-32.)

Pentico responded. (R., pp. 41-46.) The magistrate granted the state's motion
and dismissed the petition.

(R., pp. 98-99.)

1

Pentico timely appealed to the

district court (R., pp. 101-02), which affirmed (R., pp. 153-66). Pentico filed a
timely notice of appeal. {R., pp. 189-90.)

2

ISSUE

Pentico states the issue on appeal as:
I.

Did the District Court err when it upheld the Trial Court's
grant of summary dismissal?

(Appellant's brief, p. 8.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Pentico submitted no evidence suggesting that the content of his speech
was the basis for his March 25 exclusion from certain government property.
Because he presented no evidence supporting a claim that the March 25
exclusion violated his rights, did he fail to present evidence supporting his claim
that counsel was ineffective for not claiming that his rights were violated by the
March 25 exclusion?
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ARGUMENT
Pentico Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Petition
Because He Presented No Evidence Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel

A

Introduction
On appeal in the underlying criminal case, the Idaho Court of Appeals

concluded that the issue of whether Pentico was constitutionally excluded on
March 25 from coming into the area of the Governor's office thereafter was not
preserved and was not fundamental error.
P.3d at 522-28.

Pentico, 151 Idaho at 909-15, 265

The Court of Appeals noted that, even though evidence of

Pentico's behavior had been excluded at trial and in relation to the constitutional
claims, evidence at sentencing suggesting Pentico had been "involved in causing
a disturbance at the department of education and that he had recently become
persistent in contacting members of the Governor's staff regarding his issue with
the department of education."

1st at 909 n.1, 265 P.3d at 522,

n. 1.

In his petition Pentico alleged his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
claim his March 25 exclusion violated his constitutional rights.

(R., pp. 10-16.)

After the state moved for summary dismissal he filed an affidavit asserting that
on March 25 he wished to contact Representative Barrett about obtaining an
Attorney General's opinion on perceived religious discrimination at BSU but was
instead contacted by a state trooper and told to not come on certain state
property including the Governor's offices; facts he had relayed to his attorney.
(R., pp. 48-50.)

Pentico also filed an affidavit from his attorney indicating he

never considered challenging the government's action on March 25 as being

4

unconstitutional, focusing instead on the actions of April 2 that constituted the
crime. (R., pp. 79-81.)
The magistrate dismissed the ineffective assistance of counsel claim on
the basis that there was no material issue of fact. (R., p. 99.) On appeal the
district court affirmed, concluding the magistrate had correctly determined that
Pentico had failed to present sufficient evidence to indicate he would have
prevailed on a claim that the government violated Pentico's rights on March 25
by excluding him from coming to the Governor's office. (R., pp. 160-65.)
On appeal Pentico argues that the "unrebutted facts" show that he would
have prevailed on a claim that the government's actions on March 25 violated his
rights, and therefore his counsel's performance was deficient and he was
prejudiced.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 9-28.)

Application of the correct legal

standards shows Pentico failed to present evidence establishing a prima facie
claim that his counsel was ineffective for not raising a challenge to the
government's actions on March 25.

B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing the summary dismissal of a post-conviction application, the

appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact
exists which, if resolved in petitioner's favor, would require relief to be granted.
Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1992). The
court freely reviews the district court's application of the law.

1st at 434,

835 P.2d

at 669. However, the court is not required to accept either the applicant's mere
conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's
5

conclusions of law.

Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112

(2001).
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's
decision to determine whether it correctly decided the issues presented to it on
appeal." Barley v. Smith, 149 Idaho 171, 176, 233 P.3d 102, 107 (2010); see
also Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008).

C.

The Lower Courts Properly Concluded Pentico Had Failed To Establish A
Prima Facie Claim Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
"To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must

present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace,
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581,
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). The elements of a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel are: 1) that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, and 2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984).
"As a general matter, the First Amendment means that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter,
or its content." United States v. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2543 (2012) (internal
quotation and brackets omitted).

Reasonable time, place and manner

restrictions are allowed, but only if "justified without reference to the content of
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the regulated speech."

RAV. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992)

(internal quotation omitted). Idaho's trespass statute is "capable of constitutional
application to government-owned nonpublic forums, such as government office
buildings or portions of college campuses that, unlike traditional public forums
such as a public street, public park or sidewalk, or the steps of the state Capitol
building, are not open to the public for expressive activities." State v. Korsen,
138 Idaho 706, 715, 69 P.3d 126, 135 (2003) (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983)), abrogated on other grounds
Evans v. Michigan, 133 S.Ct. 1069 (2013).
To show that his constitutional rights were violated on March 25, Pentico's
trial counsel would have had to prove that the exclusion from the Governor's
offices that day was based on the content of Pentico's speech, as opposed to a
content neutral decision or one based on non-communicative conduct, volume,
or active disruption of the activities of others. See State v. Poe, 139 Idaho 885,
895-96, 88 P.3d 704, 714-15 (2004) (upholding constitutionality of disturbing the
peace statute insofar as it prohibits disturbing the peace by loud noise or conduct
or unprotected speech such as "fighting words"); State v. Suiter, 138 Idaho 13,
56 P.3d 775 (2002) (allowing conviction for disturbing the peace for yelling at
police officer in police station only if content of speech is not considered).

If

counsel was able to establish that the restriction was content-based, the
restriction would have been "presumed invalid" and the State would have had the
burden of showing constitutionality.

Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. at 2543-44 (citing

Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004)).

7

The evidence presented by Pentico does not state a viable claim that his
First Amendment rights were violated. Specifically, there is no evidence that the
March 25 instruction that Pentico was not to come to the Governor's office area
was based in any way on the content of protected speech. Pentico alleges that
the officer told him that he was being asked to not be on certain State property,
including the Governor's office, because his "behavior was making people
nervous and uncomfortable." (R., p. 49.) He further alleges the Capitol annex
was "the only government office [he] visited" on March 25, 2008. (Id.) He does
not deny that he was "involved in causing a disturbance at the department of
education and that he had recently become persistent in contacting members of
the Governor's staff regarding his issue with the department of education."
Pentico, 151 Idaho at 909 n.1, 265 P.3d at 522, n. 1.
This evidence, and the other evidence Pentico submitted (R., pp. 48-97),
does not establish any basis for a motion claiming that excluding Pentico from
visits to the Governor's office constituted a First Amendment violation. There is
no evidence that the

State excluded

Pentico for the content of any

constitutionally protected speech. Indeed, he fails to articulate that any speech
or other expression was at all involved. Because he failed to establish any claim
that his right to free speech was implicated, he failed to make a prima facie
showing that his attorney's performance was deficient or prejudicial.
Pentico asserts that the "trespass statute as applied

under the

circumstances of this case is unconstitutionally overbroad." (Appellant's brief, p.
13; see also p. 14 ("The overbreadth doctrine is a means of challenging the

8

constitutionality of a statute on its face or as applied to particular conduct.").)
Based on this erroneous legal assertion, he argues that his exclusion from
certain State property for a year was overly broad, and therefore his trial counsel
could have claimed a constitutional violation even though Pentico was not
exercising any constitutional rights on April 6, the time of the trespass for which
he was actually convicted. 1

(Appellant's brief, pp. 13-28. 2 )

Because the

argument is based on an erroneous legal assertion, it fails.
"The traditional rule is that a person to whom a statute may constitutionally
be applied may not challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably
be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the court." Los
Angeles Police Dept. v. United Reporting Pub. Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 38 (1999)
(internal quotes omitted).

Overbreadth challenges are "discouraged" because

they "call for relaxing familiar requirements of standing, to allow a determination
that the law would be unconstitutionally applied to different parties and different
circumstances from those at hand." Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609
(2004).

Because an "overbreadth" challenge is by definition a claim that "the law

To the extent Pentico is claiming he was exercising a constitutional right on April
6, such an argument is barred by the appellate decision in the criminal case.
Pentico, 151 Idaho at_, 265 P.3d at 527-28.
1

Pentico also argues that because he had no legal mechanism to challenge the
scope or enforceability of the exclusion he was denied due process. (Appellant's
brief, pp. 18-21.) That trial counsel was ineffective for failing to claim a
procedural due process violation was not raised below. Moreover, the State
afforded Pentico a criminal trial, the most process anyone is due. Finally, the
State acknowledges that it may not punish Pentico if he was in fact exercising a
First Amendment right regardless of the process afforded. For these reasons
this argument is irrelevant.
2
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would

be

unconstitutionally

applied

to

different

parties

and

different

circumstances from those at hand," there is by definition no such thing as an
"overbreadth as applied" challenge.
Moreover, overbreadth is a facial challenge to the validity of a statute.
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472-73 (2010).

"The first step in

overbreadth analysis is to construe the challenged statute; it is impossible to
determine whether a statute reaches too far without first knowing what the statute
covers."

United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293 (2008).

The Idaho

Supreme Court has already upheld the trespassing statute against an
overbreadth challenge.

Korsen, 138 Idaho at 713-16, 69 P.3d at 133-36.

Pentico's claim that the statute may have been unconstitutionally applied to him
under circumstances other than those on April 6 (for which he was charged and
convicted) would necessarily have been rejected because the statute is not
overbroad.
Finally, the Supreme Court of the United States has stated that banning a
person's reentry onto government property, even if the reentry is for the specific
purpose of exercising the right to free speech, does not violate the First
Amendment as long as the grounds for banning the person from the property in
the first place was not based on that person's exercise of a right.

Virginia v.

Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 123 (2003) ("punishment of a person who has (pursuant to
a lawful regulation) been banned from a public park after vandalizing it, and who
ignores the ban in order to take part in a political demonstration" does not
"implicate[] the First Amendment"). Pentico's argument that his exclusion could
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theoretically have curtailed his access to a public forum or other exercise of his
right to free speech does not even implicate the First Amendment.
Pentico's evidence does not support a prima facie claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel for not filing a motion claiming that excluding Pentico from
coming to the area of the Governor's office on March 25 violated Pentico's First
Amendment rights. Although excluding Pentico from the Governor's office area
because of the content of his speech would have been a violation of his
constitutional rights, Pentico presented no evidence indicating such was the
Likewise, Pentico's argument on appeal that his counsel should have

case.
claimed

that

the

exclusion

may

have violated

Pentico's

rights

under

circumstances other than those for which he was prosecuted has no basis in the
law. Pentico has therefore failed to show any error in the summary dismissal of
his petition.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's
opinion affirming the magistrate's summary dismissal of Pentico's petition for
post-conviction relief.

DATED this 12th day of January, 2015.
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